Demystifying Legal Reasoning
Cambridge University Press, 2008
By Emily Sherwin and Larry Alexander

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning in interpretation of texts and when prior judicial decisions determine the law. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practice special forms of reasoning is false.

”The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law”
Cornell Law Review, forthcoming
By Gergory S. Alexander

Abstract: This article introduces the social obligation theory as an alternative to the law-and economics theory that dominates contemporary legal property scholarship. The author argues that both private and public American property law include a social-obligation norm, but that this norm has never been explicitly recognized or systematically developed and that a proper understanding of the social obligation offers a superior explanation to a wide array of existing legal doctrine in American property law.

”Properties of Community”
By Gregory S. Alexander  and Eduardo M. Peñalver

Abstract: In contrast to the dominant Anglo-American theories of community at work, which view community obligations as fundamentally instrumental and contractual, the authors propose a theory that views the relationship between the individual and community as constitutive and substantive.

”Anti-Foreign-Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements”
By John James Barceló III

Abstract: Despite agreeing that courts should exercise great caution concerning anti-foreign-suit injunctions, the author argues in favor of such a remedy in a particular setting where enforcing an agreement to arbitrate is at stake. The author discusses two recent court decisions in the UK (Through Transport and West Tankers) that exemplify the approach advocated.

”It's Like Déjà Vu All Over Again: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel”
 American Journal of Criminal Law, forthcoming
By John H. Blume

Abstract: This article explores the jurisprudential road to Strickland, and from Strickland to Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. It then posits that, viewed through the lens of history, the Court's use of the ABA guidelines is reminiscent of the standard Judge Bazelon articulated thirty years ago in Decoster v. United States, which the Court rejected in Strickland. Consciously or subconsciously, the Court has now embraced a variation of Bazelon's Decoster approach when reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, thus using the ABA guidelines to put some “flesh” on the Strickland “skeleton.” Finally, the article explores the effect of the Court's decisions on ineffective assistance of counsel claims reviewed by the state and federal courts, concluding that additional reforms are needed if the promise of effective assistance of counsel is to become a reality.